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IN LIGHT  OF EVENTS  of the past several  years,  I find  that the only  advice 
I can give about monetary and fiscal policy is to stabilize the rate of growth 
of money in the neighborhood of 5 to 6 percent and to balance the high 
employment federal  budget for the foreseeable future. Underlying this posi- 
tion is a very simple observation: although macroeconomics has developed 
apace in the postwar period, its application to policy has brought no steady 
improvement  in the performance of the U.S. economy. While the postwar 
period as a whole looks much better than the years between the wars, the 
lack of clear improvement from 1946 to  1974 is disturbing. The case for 
continuing an activist stabilization policy requires a conviction that such 
a policy has a brighter future than is suggested by the record. 
In reviewing possible explanations for the  postwar experience, I  am 
unable to  convince myself that an activist policy will be  superior to  a 
"steady-as-she-goes"  policy. Most of this report is devoted to a discussion 
of possible explanations of the postwar stabilization record. At  the end, 
these arguments are applied to the situation now facing policy makers. In 
particular,  I attempt to explain why my policy views are so different from 
those of James Tobin. 
Note: The views  expressed  are those of the author  and do not necessarily  reflect  those 
of the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston. 
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Explanations  of the Postwar  Stabilization  Record 
Three  explanations  have  been offered  for the mediocre  record  of stabili- 
zation  policy:  (1) the  economy  has  become  increasingly  difficult  to manage; 
(2) macroeconomic  knowledge  has not increased  nearly  as much over  the 
postwar  period  as the explosive  growth  in the journal literature  might 
suggest;  (3) avoidable  errors  of stabilization  policy have been frequent. 
These  explanations  will be considered  in turn. 
THE UNRULY  ECONOMY 
Under  the view that the economy  has become increasingly  difficult  to 
manage,  policy has prevented  economic  performance  from deteriorating 
even  though  it has  not been  successful  in bringing  about  a definite  improve- 
ment. I do not find this argument  persuasive.  Although  substantial  dis- 
turbances  have occurred  in the past decade-assassinations,  conflicts  over 
desegregation,  the Vietnam  War,  two Mideast  wars,  Watergate,  the Arab 
oil embargo,  the flight  of Peruvian  anchovies,  and so on-they  have been 
no worse  than the disturbances  in the earlier  postwar  years. The end of 
World  War II required  an enormous  reallocation  of resources  from war- 
time  to peacetime  uses.  The  Berlin  crisis  in 1949,  the Korean  War,  the 1956 
Mideast  war that closed the Suez Canal and disrupted  petroleum  sup- 
plies-all threatened  economic  stability. 
Even if recent  and earlier  disturbances  were equally  severe,  one might 
argue  that  the current  structure  of the economy  magnifies  the effects  of the 
disturbances  that  do occur  and  that,  in particular,  the economy  now exhib- 
its an inflationary  bias that did not afflict  it before. 
Again,  I find this argument  unconvincing.  There  were  earlier  instances 
in which the rate of inflation  was slow to decline  in the face of excess 
capacity.  In the most infamous  example,  wages  and prices  stopped  falling 
after  1933,  in spite  of continuous  high  unemployment.  In the  late  fifties  and 
early sixties, the inflation  rate-which had risen to about 4 percent  in 
1956-decelerated  only slowly  before  stabilizing  at a little over 1 percent 
in 1962-63,  in spite  of two recessions  and an unemployment  rate  continu- 
ously  above  5 percent.1  The  behavior  of the inflation  rate  after  1969  is quite 
consistent  with these earlier  instances.  By 1969  inflationary  expectations 
1. In the two years preceding  the business  cycle peak in the third quarter  of 1957, 
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were entrenched, and the 1969-70 recession was mild compared with those 
of 1957-58 and 196061.2 
The economy has been more inflationary  in recent years, but not neces- 
sarily more inflation-prone.  The problem is to explain wage and price infla- 
tion; an appeal to rising wages and prices as evidence of greater  susceptibil- 
ity to inflation is circular reasoning. Excluding statistics on prices and the 
money stock, economic data do not indicate that since, say, 1965, the sys- 
tem has changed in such a way as to become more susceptible to inflation. 
Industrial concentration is no greater than before, and imports have en- 
hanced competitiveness in some industries. Nor do the data suggest that 
union power has become any greater. 
As a scientific matter, one must accept the hypothesis that the nation 
could reduce the inflation rate nearly to zero if it were willing to accept 
the late 1950s'  medicine of several recessions. Sadly, we have no evidence 
that  any prescription other than recession, possibly protracted, will  be 
efficacious. 
IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE 
I have considerable sympathy with the second view-that  macroeco- 
nomic knowledge has not increased as much as many might think. For 
one thing, some of the advance involved unlearning things that  weren't 
true-in  particular, the  extreme Keynesian  view  that  "money  doesn't 
matter." Currently  accepted views on money are, I think, much closer to 
those of Irving Fisher than to  those  of  Alvin Hansen.  More  important, 
the improvement in empirical knowledge has not been sufficient to permit 
the theory to be of much help in devising activist policies.3 
An activist policy requires  considerable empirical  knowledge, first, about 
the magnitude and timing of the effects of policy instruments; and second, 
it rose at a 2.0 percent  rate; and in the next two-1959:3-1961:3-at  a 1.3 percent  rate. 
Although economists  may differ  as to whether  the deceleration  of inflation  after 1957 
should be regarded  as "slow," political leaders  are certain  to regard  a deceleration  in- 
volving  half, or more,  of a presidential  term  as "slow,"  especially  when  it is characterized 
by distressingly  high unemployment. 
2. Unemployment  peaked  at 7.5 percent  in July 1958,  and at 7.1 percent  in May 1961; 
the 1970 peak (in December)  was 6.2 percent.  If allowance  were made for changes  in 
the structure  of the labor  force  between  the late 1950s  and 1970s,  the differences  between 
the 1970 peak and the earlier  peaks  would be even greater. 
3. Indeed,  I would  argue  that advances  in the theory  of policy over  the postwar  period 
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about the state of the economy over much of the period during which the 
changes in policy instruments will have their impact. 
As  a theoretical matter, uncertainties about the effects of  policy and 
about economic  forecasts  argue not  for  the  abandonment  of  activist 
policy, but rather  for policy settings closer to historical averages  than would 
otherwise be appropriate.4  However, activist policy should be further tem- 
pered to  avert the  possible  problem of  "instrument instability."5 This 
problem arises because economic forecasts typically apply over a period 
far shorter than that affected by policy changes. Depending on the nature 
of the distributed lag response of the economy to policy changes, it may 
not be possible to use policy in one period to offset the effects of policy in 
the previous period. Knowing  whether instrument instability is  in  fact 
relevant requires substantial knowledge  about  the  forecasts and about 
distributed  lags; in my view, this kind of precision simply is not available 
in an economy whose unemployment rate is in the neighborhood of, say, 
4 to 6 percent. 
The empirical magnitudes of key economic parameters are still in con- 
siderable dispute. To take one example, in the recent study by Goldfeld 
that Tobin cites, the income elasticity of the demand for money was esti- 
mated to be 0.68,6 well below the estimate of 1.0 generally accepted a few 
years ago. While Goldfeld was extremely careful and resourceful, his find- 
ings must be  replicated by  other investigators on  other bodies  of  data 
before they can be confidently accepted. The few cases in which earlier 
studies have been redone give good reason for caution: equations typically 
have performed poorly in predicting events after the publication of the 
original studies.7 
theory  demonstrates  that stabilization  of a complex  dynamic  system  may  require  counter- 
intuitive  policies and that intuitive  policies may be quite destabilizing.  Moreover,  rela- 
tively small differences  in parameter  values may determine  whether  or not a particular 
policy is stabilizing. 
4. See William  Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy," in American 
Economic  Association,  Papers  and Proceedings  of  the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting, 
1966 (American Economic Review, Vol.  57, May  1967), pp. 411-25. 
5. See Robert S. Holbrook, "Optimal  Economic  Policy and the Problem of Instru- 
ment Instability," American Economic Review, Vol.  62 (March  1972), pp. 57-65. 
6. Stephen  M. Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited,"  Brookings  Papers  on 
Economic  Activity  (3 :1973),  pp. 577-638. Hereafter,  this document  will be referred  to as 
BPEA, followed  by the date. 
7. For two examples,  see Charles  R. Nelson, "The Prediction  Performance  of the 
FRB-MIT-Penn  Model of the U.S. Economy," American  Economic  Review, Vol. 62 William  Poole  237 
A good example of the dangers of trying to do too much at the current 
state of knowledge is the paper I wrote in the summer of  1970.8 There I 
argued-with  the standard caveats in both the notes and the text-that  as 
of mid-1970 the economy was in a recession, characterized by a high, in- 
herited, rate of inflation. The goal of policy was to reduce the inflation rate 
over a period of years while minimizing the cost in terms of unemployment. 
Several policy options were illustrated through simulations of the Fed- 
eral Reserve-MIT-Penn  econometric model of the United States. The basic 
feature of  these simulations was that as  inflation, and inflationary ex- 
pectations, declined, nominal interest rates would have to be pushed down 
by temporarily rapid growth in the money supply. Unless  the  nominal 
rate of interest fell, the real rate would rise, choking off investment and 
causing a recession.9 
The argument seemed sensible to me in 1970, and seems sensible to me 
now. But looking back, I find that, for the ensuing period as a whole, the 
policy advice stemming from it was wrong. Macro policy has not been 
dramatically different from the stance assumed in my  1970 simulations, 
and yet the performance of the economy has been dramatically different.10 
What went wrong? 
Perhaps the argument was basically correct but  the  time  frame was 
wrong. If the lags in the effects of policy actions are longer than those in- 
corporated in  the  FMP  model,  the  model  may  have  understated the 
(December  1972), pp. 902-17; William Poole and Elinda  B. F. Kornblith,  "The Fried- 
man-Meiselman  CMC Paper: New Evidence  on an Old Controversy,"  American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  Vol. 63 (December 1973), pp. 908-17. Consumption  studies may be a 
major  exception  to the general  record of poor post-sample  predictive  performance.  See 
Arthur M. Okun, "The Personal Tax Surcharge  and Consumer Demand, 1968-70," 
BPEA (1: 1971),  pp. 167-204. Even in this study, however,  consumer  spending on du- 
rables  substantially  exceeded  levels predicted  on the basis of earlier  studies. 
8. "Gradualism:  A Mid-Course  View,"  BPEA (2:1970), pp. 271-95. 
9. This argument  would be consistent with any model containing a demand-for- 
money function  with unitary  income elasticity  and a negative  interest  elasticity. If the 
income elasticity  is below unity, the same basic argument  holds except that a less rapid 
rate of money growth  is required. 
10. "Simulation  B" in the paper had a money growth  rate of 5.8 percent,  continu- 
ously compounded,  from 1968:4 to 1972:4, and of 9.5 percent  from 1972:4 through 
1975:4.  The actual  rate  of money  growth  was 6.0 percent  for 1968:4-1972:4 and 6.1 per- 
cent for 1972:4-1973:4. The simulation also assumed a moderately  restrictive  fiscal 
policy,  with the full employment  surplus  rising  to a little over 1 percent  of GNP in 1973- 
75. On a calendar-year  basis,  the ftull  employment  budget  surplus  in fact has been  within 
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strength  left over  from  the expansionary  policies  of 1965-68.  Furthermore, 
the inflation  rate over  the past year  may have been fed by price  catch-up 
once controls  were  removed,  and by fears  of further  controls. 
Unfortunately,  explanations  involving  the FMP model  are  now difficult 
to verify.  The  current  version  (now called  the MPS model)  is substantially 
different  from  the 1970  version.  It would, I believe,  be a very substantial 
undertaking  to reconstruct  and run the 1970 version in an attempt  to 
identify  the equations  that went off track. 
There  is a further  reason  to doubt  that  the current  body of knowledge  is 
adequate  to the demands  of countercyclical  stabilization  policy.  In a recent 
paper,  Robert  Lucas  showed  that the structure  of the economy  is, in prin- 
ciple,  dependent  on the nature  of the policies  followed.11  Thus  government 
stabilization  policies may fail because they themselves  will change the 
structure  of the economy.  Policy  makers  cannot  manipulate  taxes,  interest 
rates, and other variables  under the assumption  that the economy  will 
respond  as it did in the past. Past responses  to tax changes,  for example, 
may  have  been  conditioned  by the view  that  they  were  required  to raise  (or 
lower)  revenues.  The same  responses  cannot  be expected  if tax changes  be- 
come viewed  as temporary  and reversible  stabilization  tools. While  there 
is considerable  dispute  about  the empirical  importance  of this argument,  it 
must  be regarded  as a significant  warning.  At a minimum,  government  de- 
cision makers  must  be aware  that private  decision  makers  may be basing 
their actions in part on forecasts  of future policies and not merely on 
current  levels  of tax rates,  money  growth,  and the like. 
To summarize,  technical  economic  analysis  makes  a case for continuous 
adjustments  in policy instruments,  with the adjustments  being larger  the 
larger  the prospective  deviation  of the economy  from  its desired  track.  If 
I had complete  control over policy, I would indeed move the levers  to 
some  extent  from  time  to time,  although  by less  than  would  policy  activists. 
My relative inactivity  would rest not on principle  but rather on my 
skepticism  about the efficacy  of activist  policies  for improving  economic 
performance. 
AVOIDABLE  ERRORS 
The third  and strongest  argument  for maintaining  an activist  policy in 
face of its apparent  failures  in the past  is that  the policy  mistakes  of recent 
11. "Econometric  Policy Evaluation:  A Critique"  (forthcoming). William  Poole  239 
years were not inevitable. Two types of mistakes must be distinguished: 
those stemming from faulty economic analysis-the  issue just discussed- 
and those stemming from the failure of economists' prescriptions to gain 
political acceptance. 
The issue of the political acceptance of stabilization measures is much 
the tougher of the two. The debate has centered on two questions. First, 
should a democracy rely on the discretion of the authorities or on rules? 
Second, if the nation is not to rely on rules, should economic policy be 
made by Congress, by the President, or by an independent agency? 
Arthur Okun has recently summarized this debate so clearly that I can 
do no better than refer the reader to  his discussion.12 The flavor of his 
argument is that, whatever the  failures of  postwar stabilization policy, 
policy rules cannot necessarily  be expected to help. The political pressures 
that have contributed to past mistakes in discretionary policy can also be 
expected to bend any rules that might be laid down. Moreover, it is surely 
better for economists to devote their energies to improving the political 
procedures  underlying  discretionary  policy than to work toward acceptance 
of suboptimal policy rules in an attempt to save the nation from irrational 
behavior. 
Okun's paper, and previous discussions of the same issues, concentrates 
on the question of how economic policy ought to be made. Advocates of 
discretionary  policy  use an analytical  framework  in which  economic  policy 
instruments  are adjusted  to optimize  an objective  function,  given  the con- 
straint  imposed  by the structure  of the economy.  Arguing  on a normative 
level, they believe  that such an analytical  policy  model ought  to be used, 
while advocates  of rules  have tended  to argue  that this model  is inappro- 
priate  in a democratic  society.  To push  this debate  further,  I believe  that a 
different  question  should  be examined.  How are  governmental  decisions  in 
fact made in democratic  societies?  Apart  from the normative  issue, there 
is a scientific  issue involved  that requires  that  the constraints  imposed  by 
the structure  of the democratic  political  process  be added  to the analyti- 
cal model. In the area of economic  policy, future  progress  may depend 
more on advances  in "positive  politics"  than on advances  in "positive 
economics." 
Several  observations  about positive politics-which are personal,  un- 
documented,  and  perhaps  wrong-may help to suggest  the kinds  of politi- 
cal constraints  I have  in mind.  Successful  democratic  societies  are  charac- 
12. Arthur M. Okun, "Fiscal-Monetary  Activism: Some Analytical  Issues,"  BPEA 
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terized less by the voting booth than by continuous, open, public debate 
over governmental policies and by a healthy public skepticism about the 
wisdom of public officials. Sensible policies that are not sold to the public 
either are never instituted or are repealed before they have time to become 
effective. Indeed, a positive-politics fact of life seems to be that legislators 
are frequently forced to  support positions they personally believe to  be 
unsound in order to  enhance their prospects for reelection. This obser- 
vation leads some  economists  to  support policy  rules-although  some 
support them for other reasons-and  others to support control over policy 
by the executive branch or by an independent agency.13 
In a democracy, policy making-whatever  its subject-cannot  be insu- 
lated from the political process. For example, the Federal Reserve is not 
fundamentally independent, but severely constrained, although somewhat 
less so than would be the case if its governors served at the pleasure of the 
President rather than for fixed fourteen-year terms. 
The impossibility of insulating public policy from politics is a conse- 
quence of enjoying an extremely competitive political and journalistic en- 
vironment. And  the  same  argument obviously  applies  to  attempts to 
insulate automatic rules from tinkering. Neither legislated rules nor inde- 
pendent agencies that do  not  command continuing public support will 
survive. 
It should be emphasized that the discussion is meant to be within the 
vein of positive analysis. I am not talking about how the chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers might maximize the number of votes for his 
party at the next election. What I am talking about are the constraints 
within which the nonpartisan ivory-tower economist ought to frame his 
policy recommendations. 
If an economic policy is to be politically viable in the long run, I believe 
it must be not only economically sensible but also understandable to the 
public. In a successful democracy, good decisions are made when both the 
government and the public are well informed on the issues. Thus a policy 
that is merely "satisficing" given the constraint imposed by the structure 
13. The argument  that politics produces bad policy is not confined  to economists. 
I suspect  that every professional  group feels it could carry out policies that would en- 
large the national welfare if only the proper mechanism,  free of "excessive"  political 
control,  were established.  But, looking at this argument  from a positive, as opposed to 
a normative,  point of view, I see no evidence  that government  policy decisions  are better 
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of the economy  may be optimal  given  the combined  economic  and politi- 
cal constraints. 
Policy must be understandable  because  in view of the frequency  with 
which  authorities  have erred,  or have even deliberately  misled,  people  are 
justifiably  wary  of those who insist that the issues  are  too complicated  to 
understand.  At a minimum,  people  will  want  to hear  the views  of a number 
of experts;  but even this approach  will be of little value on controversial 
issues,  since respected  experts  wili be found on both sides. As a result  of 
the questioning  nature  of the political  process,  policies  dependent  for their 
success  on timely  adjustments  in response  to events  will remain  unreliable. 
For example,  political  arguments  (as well as professional  uncertainties) 
about the distribution  of tax burdens  have  distorted  the timing  of changes 
in the investment  tax credit  since  it was introduced  in 1962  so as to make 
them almost  exactly  procyclical. 
An economic  policy  adviser  confronts  problems  analogous  to those  of an 
investment  adviser.  In managing  his personal  portfolio  the investment  ad- 
viser  can follow  his own analysis  to the full extent  of his confidence  in it. 
But managing  someone  else's money requires  a different  approach.  The 
advice  must be consistent  with the client's  investment  objectives,  his atti- 
tudes toward  risk, and his willingness  to act quickly  when necessary  and 
not to act at all while  riding  out a string  of disappointments.  Moreover, 
the adviser  must  retain  the client's  confidence  that his money  is not being 
used for someone  else's  benefit.  Thus  the adviser  needs  not only technical 
competence  but the ability  to explain  the investment  problem  so that the 
client does not expect  more  than can be delivered. 
In this context,  what  can I say about  my "gradualism"  paper?  Could  I 
expect  to explain  its argument  to intelligent  laymen?  If the economy  failed 
to perform  as promised,  could I explain,  a year  later,  that policy  making 
necessarily  involves  uncertainties,  that the policy  followed  really  was opti- 
mal ex ante in the context  of a stochastic  model, and that I couldn't  be 
blamed  for the unlucky  roll of the dice?  Could  I fault  the layman  who sus- 
pected  that I was merely  rationalizing  my poor performance  or that my 
policy  adjustments  were  really  designed  to help  some  special  interest  group? 
Even  if the policy  adviser  has faith in his technical  knowledge  to make 
continuous  small adjustments  in policy instruments,  he must remember 
that he cannot operate  the policy levers  directly  and that others  operate 
them, too. Moreover,  the public and Congress  will, I believe,  inevitably 
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neighborhood  of full employment  than economists  can in fact deliver; 
the resulting  disillusionment  erodes public confidence  in the ability of 
economists  to solve  any  problems. 
These  constraints  imposed  by the workings  of democratic  societies  can 
be ignored  no more  than  those imposed  by the structure  of the economy. 
Along with  the lack of economic  knowledge,  they are sufficient  to convert 
an activist  in principle  into an advocate  of neutral  settings  of policy  instru- 
ments in a wide range of situations.  If economists  are to inspire  public 
confidence  that they will not play politics with their recommendations, 
they must construct  policy guidelines  that appear  to be practicable  most 
of the time.'4  Discretionary  policy can then be viewed  as specifying  de- 
partures  from the general guidelines.  Debates over such discretionary 
departures  will inevitably-and  appropriately-take place within the 
context  of partisan  political  situations. 
If the nation is to have such guidelines,  then it seems  to me that they 
must command  widespread  support  within  the economics  profession.  In 
the view of practically  all economists,  guidelines  defined  by stable  money 
growth  and a balanced  full employment  federal  budget  would  be superior 
to those involving  stable  interest  rates  or a budget  in actual  balance.  The 
specifications  of any policy guidelines  should be extensively  debated  in 
terms  of their  general,  long-run,  suitability.  Once  a set has been accepted, 
however,  debate  over current  policy should  concentrate  on whether  there 
is good and sufficient  reason  to depart  from them. 
Policy in 1974 
What do these arguments mean for the U.S. economy in mid-1974? In 
my view, the political  and economic  constraints  leave very  little freedom 
for policy  action.  There  is not a strong  case for departing  from  the guide- 
lines  of stable  monetary  growth  and  a balanced  full  employment  budget.  A 
basically  prosperous  economy  suffering  from the disruptions  of inflation 
and wage-price  controls should be  protected from further disturbing 
changes  in monetary  and fiscal  policy and given  a chance  to settle  down. 
14. The word "guideline"  rather  than "rule"  is used here in order  to leave open the 
question  of whether  a rule  should  be embodied  in legislation.  The argument  is analogous 
to the one that the existence  of a constitution  is much more important  than whether  the 
constitution  is in written  or unwritten  form. William Poole  243 
In  mid-1974, "stable" monetary policy involves a  rate of  growth of 
money (M1) of  5 to  6 percent. Between 1966:4 and  1973:4 the rate of 
growth of M1 has fluctuated around a growth trend of 6.2 percent. At the 
same time, a stable fiscal policy defined in terms of an approximately bal- 
anced full employment budget requires a cut in federal personal income 
tax rates, or an adjustment  of the income brackets  to which current  tax rates 
apply, because the current inflation is swelling real tax revenues. In the 
long  run, less  expansionary policy  guidelines-especially  for  monetary 
policy-will  be required  if the inflation rate is to be reduced to near zero; 
but now the policy problem is to stabilize the economy around the current 
trend rate of inflation of about 5 percent. 
I differ with James Tobin on two counts. First, I cannot accept the eco- 
nomics of his argument. Second, even if his argument is correct, I do not 
believe the general public will accept it long enough to allow his policy to 
be successful. 
As  I see it, two aspects of Tobin's economic argument are especially 
questionable. First, he argues that recovery from the recession, or mini- 
recession, of early 1974 requires falling interest rates-indeed,  a drop in 
short-term rates well below the lows of early 1974. If so, it would repre- 
sent a rare exception to the general pattern of rising rates during business 
cycle  expansions. Moreover,  given the  behavior of  both  financial and 
product markets, the decline in real gross national product in the first 
quarter of 1974 looks less like a typical recession than a temporary supply 
disturbance (largely due to petroleum shortages), analogous to the impact 
of a prolonged strike in a major industry.15 
Second, and more important, there is much that economists do not un- 
derstand about the real effects of inflation, and these areas of ignorance 
are central to the interpretation of Tobin's "Q" variable. There is, I be- 
lieve, ample evidence that inflations generally alter real magnitudes from 
what they would be in a noninflationary environment. If there are such 
things as "steady-state"  inflations in which real magnitudes are essentially 
unaffected by the inflation, they would be established only very slowly. 
Extreme examples of the real effects of inflation are apparent in conditions 
of hyper-inflation. Frank Graham's book on the German inflation of the 
early 1920s contains a large number of such examples. Graham reports 
15. For example, in the third quarter  of 1959 real GNP declined at a 4.1 percent 
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that an index  of real  (that  is, deflated)  stock  prices,  with  a base of 1913  = 
100, reached  a postwar  peak of 27.4 in November 1921, and then fell 
dramatically  to 3.6 in October  1922,  finally  reaching  23.7 in October  1923, 
about the time of the currency  reform.16  German  stock prices  may have 
behaved  that way partly because corporations  found it impossible  to 
maintain  real dividends  owing to the loss of purchasing  power while 
dividend  checks were being distributed.  In another example, Graham 
reports  that the index of real housing  rentals  fell from 15.5 in May 1921 
to 0.5 in August  1923,  as rent  restrictions  and tenant  delinquencies  wiped 
out the owners of urban real estate.17  Few of these effects were well 
understood  at the time. 
Similar  effects  may now be operating  to depress  the U.S. stock market. 
The  real  tax  burden  on corporate  income  rises  with  the inflation  rate.  Wage 
and price  controls  apparently  affected  corporate  profits,  and though  they 
have ended,  their resumption  is not improbable.  Public  attitudes  toward 
profits  are not favorable,  as evidenced  by the recent  reaction  to oil com- 
pany  earnings. 
These  factors  can be expected  to alter  investment  expenditures,  but they 
are  unlikely  to encourage  corporations  and individuals  to delay  purchases 
of real  goods.  The  earnings  prospects  from  real  goods  may  be low, but they 
are not clearly  lower than the prospects  from financial  claims. Further- 
more, although  financial  assets are normally  less risky than real assets, 
long-term  bonds  are  now among  the riskiest  of investments.  On this inter- 
pretation,  recent  weakness  in bond and stock prices  does not foretell  the 
end of a spending  boom; on the contrary,  it may reflect  attempts  to ex- 
change  financial  assets  for real  assets. 
Tobin's interpretation  of the weakness  in financial  markets  may, of 
course,  be correct.  But if mine  is correct,  accelerated  growth  in the money 
stock  would  help  to generate  accelerated  inflation.  The  economy  now  is op- 
erating  close to full capacity,  especially  in materials-producing  industries, 
and has very  little  room  to absorb  risks  on the up side.  A further  accelera- 
tion of inflation  may  jeopardize  the solvency  of the thrift  institutions,  lead 
to a new  set of price  controls  far  more  rigid  than  most pro-controls  econo- 
mists  would  favor,  and  generate  other  horrors. 
Tobin's recommendations  are, it seems to me. unresponsive  to  the 
16. Frank D.  Graham, Exchange,  Prices, and Production  in Hyper-Inflation:  Ger- 
many,  1920-1923  (Princeton  University  Press, 1930), pp. 178-79. 
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public's preferences. According to  my  reading, the  policy  that reflects 
these preferences  entails acceptance of a greater  risk of recession to curtail 
inflation than would have been true ten years ago. Indeed, I believe that 
these preferences  will force public officials  to do something about inflation. 
Whether or not these preferences are entirely rational, I doubt that they 
will yield to economists' arguments in the near future. I believe that my 
position on policy ought to  reflect my best professional judgment as to 
how these preferences  can be satisfied at minimum expected cost. 
Neither Tobin nor anyone else can offer a set of proposals involving 
controls  and structural change that, based on  actual experience in this 
or  other countries, promises to  reduce inflation while maintaining es- 
sentially full employment. If I could find such a set of proposals, I would 
join  in vigorous efforts to persuade the public to tolerate inflation long 
enough for the reforms to take hold. But given the lack of a documented 
case that structural  reforms can do the job,  and given the recent demon- 
stration that controls are ineffective, I find it hard to believe that the public 
will  quietly accept continuing inflation while waiting for  a  Tobin-type 
program to work. 
If economists simply argue for the acceptance of inflation, the various 
"somethings" that are in fact done  are unlikely to  reflect professional 
thinking about  the  least-cost method  of  reaching the  public's goal  of 
slowing inflation. The policy of least expected cost, in my opinion, is the 
"steady-as-she-goes  policy" of 5 to 6 percent money growth and a balanced 
full employment budget. My best technical  judgment is that a much tighter 
policy runs a real risk of a substantial recession while a much easier policy 
runs a real risk of acceleration of inflation. As I view public preferences, 
both of these extreme outcomes must be avoided. The only way I know 
to do so is to steer a middle course, risking a middling outcome. 
Since the rate of inflation is now about 10 percent even though the rate 
of growth of the money stock has approximated my recommendation of 
5 to 6 percent, does my recommendation make sense? First, it should be 
noted that the GNP deflator rose at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent 
from 1968:4 to 1973:  4-not  out of line with the growth of money (6.0 per- 
cent) and of real GNP (3.5 percent) over the same period. The accelera- 
tion in the rate of inflation in the past year may in part reflect  fiscal stimulus 
in 1972 and the recent acceleration of money growth-M1  growth was at 
a 6.9 percent rate from 1971:4 to 1973:4, up from a 5.4 percent rate from 
1968:4 to 1971:4. For the most part, however, it probably reflects a com- 246  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
bination  of special  factors,  including  a catch-up  as controls  broke  down, 
Taking  the controls  period  as a whole,  the inflation  rate  is not surprising; 
between  1971:3 and 1974:1  the GNP deflator  rose at an annual  rate of 
5.4 percent. 
Basically,  then,  I feel  that  the  recent  rate  of inflation-8.1 percent  annual 
rate on the GNP deflator  between  1972:4  and 1974:  1-embodies a trend 
component  of about  5 percent  and  a temporary  component  of about  3 per- 
cent.  The  need  now  is to avoid  overreaction  to the temporary  component- 
either  by accelerating  money  growth  to validate  the higher  inflation  or by 
clamping  down on money growth in an attempt  to eliminate  inflation 
quickly.  A stable  policy  cannot  be sold as a guarantor  of a happy  outcome, 
but then  no economist  has a scientific  basis  for promising  very  much  in the 
present  circumstances.  Under  a stable  policy,  unemployment  could rise  to 
well  over  6 percent,  but  the  probabilities  of such  a rise  are  not so great  as to 
require  more  expansionary  policies  now. Given  the risks  of acceleration  of 
inflation,  and given  the political  problems  of promptly  reversing  more  ex- 
pansionary  policies should they prove inappropriate,  policy instruments 
should  remain  at neutral  settings  until  there  is a clear  and present  danger 
of a substantial  recession.  A year  or two from  now, the United  States  could 
do much  worse  than  emerge  from  the  current  situation  with  a mild  recession 
fading  away  and an inflation  rate stabilized  at 5 to 6 percent.  In view of 
public preferences  on both inflation and unemployment,  I have little 
confidence  that any other  policies  have a genuine  prospect  of doing  much 
better. 
Discussion 
ROBERT  J. GORDON  began  the discussion  by noting  the wide divergence 
between  Tobin's  and  Poole's  predictions  of the path  of the economy,  given 
a steady  5 to 6 percent  annual  growth  in the money  supply.  While  Poole 
saw the possibility  of decelerating  inflation and recovery  from a mild 
recession  in a year or so, Tobin, even in his more optimistic  view, had 
unemployment  increasing  until 1978.  Gordon  found  that his own calcula- 
tions tended  to support  Tobin's  results.  Because  increases  in wage rates 
could not be expected  to ease markedly  for a long time, the resulting  rate 